



**POLITECNICO**  
MILANO 1863

DIPARTIMENTO DI ENERGIA




# Future electric grids: smart, flexible and resilient


Valentin Ilea


11.04.2023

Department of Energy



## Day Ahead Market – Daily Scheduling






## Ancillary Service Market (ASM) –generation and load balancing

From: 10/04/2023 To: 10/04/2023

Last update: 10/04/2023 22:45






## EU decarbonization targets:

- 32% of total demand covered by Renewable Energy Sources (RES) by 2030
- the share of clean vehicles in the total procured at least 35% by 2025

## Impact:

- *Day-Ahead Market*: cheaper prices but fewer programmable generation available






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
## Impact:

- *Day-Ahead Market*: cheaper prices but fewer programmable generation available
- *ASM Market*: imbalance increase due to RES intermittence and lack of flexible programmable generation available
- *In general*: RES et al are spread across the distribution grid (let's call them DERs)






## TSO Centralized Model




## DSO managed Model



A. G. Givisiez, K. Petrou, and L. F. Ochoa, "A review on TSO-DSO coordination models and solution techniques," *Electr. Power Syst. Res.*, vol. 189, 2020.



**First step:** aggregation of flexibility under a POD in a single economic flexibility offer





## Second step: Optimization of flexibility

**Optimization Function:** minimize total cost of flexibility OR maximize flexibility reserve made available to TSO

### Constraints:

satisfy the power balance in each node of the network, at each time window considered

avoid thermal current limit violation for the cables of the grid

avoid voltage bounds violation in the nodes of the grid

make sure the network's load is balanced at least at PCC with the TSO



## Constraints:

satisfy the technical & physical constraints of various technologies if already not aggregated

- for example, a BESS:

$$SoE_t = SoE_{t-1} + \frac{\tilde{\Delta}t}{\tilde{E}} \left( P_t^{chg} \tilde{\eta}^{chg} + \frac{P_t^{dis}}{\tilde{\eta}^{dis}} \right)$$

$$\underline{SoE} \leq SoE_t \leq \overline{SoE}$$

$$0 \leq P_t^{chg} \leq \tilde{P}^{chg} Z_t^{chg}$$

$$\tilde{P}^{dis} Z_t^{dis} \leq P_t^{dis} \leq 0$$

$$Z_t^{chg} + Z_t^{dis} \leq 1$$

$$BRL_t = \tilde{\alpha} e^{-\tilde{\beta} d_t} + (1 - \tilde{\alpha}) e^{-d_t}$$



$$d_t = d_t^{op} + d_t^{id}$$

$$d_t^{op} = d_t^{time} + d_t^{CR} d_t^{DoD} d_t^{SoE} d_t^{Temp}$$

$$d_t^{id} = d_t^{time} d_t^{SoE} d_t^{Temp}$$





## Results





## Results








Unfortunately, future urban distribution grids face various security threats that can lead to the blackout of the grid (or a part of it):

- climate changes (e.g. heatwaves);
- cyberattacks;
- natural disasters.

Developing appropriate **resiliency strategies** is crucial as the electrical infrastructure failure affects numerous other critical infrastructures (such as fire and medical facilities, communications, and mobility).



# Resilience strategy: Robust island operation



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


Load and generation are considered curtailable (continuous or discrete) and the curtailment a paid service to the grid.


**Optimization Function:** minimize the total cost of curtailment.

**Constraints:**

Guarantee frequency security of the grid



## Generation $f$ response



# Resilience strategy: Robust island operation




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
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## Demand $f$ response






# Resilience strategy: Robust island operation

Load and generation are considered curtailable (continuous or discrete) and the curtailment a paid service to the grid.

**Optimization Function:** minimize the total cost of curtailment.

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Guarantee frequency security of the grid



$$\Delta f^{min} \leq \Delta f \leq \Delta f^{max}$$

$$P_{g,d}^{new} = P_{g,d}^{ini} + f(\Delta f)$$



Load and generation are considered curtailable (continuous or discrete) and the curtailment a paid service to the grid.

**Optimization Function:** minimize the total cost of curtailment.

**Constraints:**

satisfy the power balance in each node of the network, at each time window considered

secure minimum power reserves for future events

represent correctly the shedding model

avoid thermal current limit violation for the cables of the grid

# Resilience strategy: Robust island operation




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


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
avoid voltage bounds violation in the nodes of the grid





## Results





Shown functionalities require:

- the network be continuously monitored through RTUs;
- production and consumption be constantly forecasted;
- fast communication systems for data collection and command transmission;
- data centralization by SCADA systems.



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Thank you for attention